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If We Can’t Have It, Then No One Should:  
Shutting Down Versus Selling in Family Business Portfolios 
 
ABSTRACT 
How does a business family manage its business portfolio in times of declining performance to 
sustain the portfolio’s long-term endurance? Drawing on social identity theory and six Pakistani 
family business portfolios, we find that business families may prefer to shut down a satellite 
business rather than sell it, which is primarily driven by identity considerations. In addition, the 
family’s goal to recycle the assets, the aim to restart the business later, and the increasing decline 
in performance are important contingency factors. This study contributes to the literature on 
portfolio entrepreneurship, business exit, and the enduring entrepreneurship of family firms. 
 
“We would rather close down the business than sell it to someone else.”  
Director, Kasf 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How does a business family remain entrepreneurial over time? To answer this question, 
numerous scholars have applied a transgenerational entrepreneurship lens (cf. Habbershon et al., 
2010; Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a) and focused on family-level analysis (e.g., Habbershon and 
Pistrui, 2002; Nordqvist and Zellweger 2010), which allows researchers to assess business 
families’ portfolios of entrepreneurial activities over time and beyond their core legacy 
business1. A recent study by Zellweger et al. (2012b) shows that 90 percent of surveyed 
entrepreneurial families are engaged with more than one firm, which explains the increasing 
importance of the portfolio entrepreneurship literature both in general (Carter and Ram, 2003; 
Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008) and in the specific context of family business (DeTienne and 
                                                     
1 A core legacy business is the founding business (cf. Carter and Ram, 2003; Feldman, 2013).  
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Chirico, 2013; Sieger et al., 2011). In fact, portfolio entrepreneurship has been identified as an 
important determinant of business families’ long-term entrepreneurial success (Sieger et al., 
2011). 
However, there is an important gap in the literature because extant portfolio entrepreneurship 
literature has largely concentrated on the characteristics of portfolio entrepreneurs (e.g., 
Westhead and Wright, 1998), their reasons for engaging in portfolio entrepreneurship (Carter and 
Ram, 2003), and recently, the process of establishing a business portfolio (Sieger et al., 2011). 
However, successful portfolio entrepreneurship does not end with portfolio creation; instead, it 
involves constant renewal (Dess et al., 2003), adaptation and change (Zellweger et al., 2012b), 
and a continuous, dynamic process of exiting and entering business activities (DeTienne and 
Chirico, 2013; Salvato et al., 2010). Indeed, portfolio entrepreneurship is unlikely to follow a 
linear path; instead, there will be phases of expansion and contraction (Rosa et al., 2005), in 
which portfolio consolidation and development occur through careful divestment and acquisition 
processes (Iacobucci and Rosa, 2010). In the family firm context, the decision to exit one or 
several portfolio businesses, so-called satellite portfolio firms2, is difficult but often necessary 
(Salvato et al., 2010) to preserve the nonfinancial benefits tied to the overall business portfolio, 
particularly in times of declining performance (DeTienne and Chirico, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, whether, how, and why a business family exits from its satellite portfolio 
firms and which satellite portfolio firms it chooses to exit remain unknown; such information 
would greatly enhance our understanding of business families’ long-term enduring 
entrepreneurship, particularly in times of decline.  
                                                     
2 A satellite portfolio firm is a secondary/subsequent business established after the core business (cf. Carter and Ram, 2003). 
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To close this research gap, we investigate how business families react to the declining 
performance of their business portfolios; specifically, we focus on the exit strategies that are 
deployed with regard to satellite firms and their underlying motivating factors. Because of the 
limited amount of extant theory, we follow a qualitative approach and study a sample of six 
Pakistani family business portfolios that each experienced a decline, meaning that the business 
portfolio’s overall performance deteriorated over a persistent period (Weitzel and Jonsson, 
1989). We examine 49 businesses and 20 exits. Our main data sources are interviews 
supplemented with observations and other supporting evidence collected between December 
2010 and January 2014. We apply social identity theory as conceptual lens (cf. Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989) because it is well known both that business families strongly identify themselves 
with their firm(s) (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz, 2008; Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013) and that 
such identification is likely to affect divestment or exit choices (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Sharma and Manikutty, 2005).  
As a first key insight, we reveal that a business family may prefer to “shut down” a satellite 
portfolio firm (i.e., close down operations and keep the assets) rather than sell it to a third party – 
even if the latter was an available option. This “if we can’t have it, then no one should” approach 
contrasts with the classic profit-maximizing model. Indeed, in all of our investigated exit cases, 
selling the firm would have enabled the family to generate immediate financial revenue (Decker 
and Mellewigt, 2007; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Wennberg et al., 2010) that could have 
been used for other (entrepreneurial) purposes (see DeTienne, 2010; Lieberman et al., 2016; 
Mason and Harrison, 2006). Second, by analyzing the motives behind this decision from a social 
identity theory perspective, we reveal that the likelihood of shutting down versus selling a 
satellite firm is higher when there is a high degree of fit between the family and the satellite 
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business identity. In addition, the goals of recycling the resources, of restarting the satellite 
business in the future, and the degree of performance decline are important contingency factors 
of the above-stated relationship. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Portfolio entrepreneurship 
Portfolio entrepreneurship refers to the simultaneous ownership and management of several 
businesses (Alsos and Kolvereid, 1998; Carter and Ram, 2003) or to the parallel discovery and 
exploitation of two or more business opportunities (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008). Scholars 
agree on the economic and social relevance of portfolio entrepreneurship (cf. Westhead and 
Wright, 1998), and Carter and Ram (2003: 375) depict it as a “ubiquitous feature of the 
economic landscape,” which has recently led to a growing body of literature.  
Nevertheless, portfolio entrepreneurship was largely ignored by scholars until the level of 
analysis shifted from the firm to the individual (Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Most recently, research 
has established that the business family that owns the portfolio is an appropriate level of analysis 
because of business families’ strong engagement in portfolio entrepreneurship (Sieger et al., 
2011; Zellweger et al., 2012b). Indeed, portfolio entrepreneurship is particularly relevant in the 
family firm context because family dynamics may strongly affect why and how a portfolio is 
sustained (Carter and Ram, 2003; Jaffe and Lane, 2004). Portfolio entrepreneurship can be a 
promising strategy to achieve long-term success and to remain entrepreneurial in the long run. 
Thus, portfolio entrepreneurship plays a crucial role in the context of transgenerational 
entrepreneurship (Zellweger et al., 2012a) and long-term strategic entrepreneurship (Iacobucci 
and Rosa, 2010; Rosa, 1998). It has been found to lead to lower failure rates in business clusters 
(Rosa and Scott, 1999) and to enhance firm survival and growth (Iacobucci and Rosa, 2010).  
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The literature has identified various individual- and organizational-level differences between 
portfolio (or “habitual”) entrepreneurs and novice and serial entrepreneurs – for instance 
regarding their personal background and attitudes, financial aspects, and performance (Westhead 
and Wright, 1998) or in terms of the mode of organizing portfolio entrepreneurship (Wiklund 
and Shepherd, 2008). Research also shows that the various types of portfolio entrepreneurs (such 
as “starters” and “acquirers”) differ with regard to how they leverage human capital (see 
Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Among the reasons why business families engage in portfolio 
entrepreneurship are the goals of diversifying risk, generating income, and securing employment 
for family members (Carter and Ram, 2003; Mulholland, 1997; Ram, 1994). The process of 
building up a portfolio of family businesses has been addressed by Sieger et al. (2011) who 
investigated this aspect from a resource-based perspective. 
Despite these earlier works, however, there is a critical lack of knowledge about how a family 
business portfolio is managed in the long run. It is very important to illuminate the process of 
portfolio entrepreneurship and to gain a better understanding of the dynamic, procedural, and 
evolutionary nature of family portfolio entrepreneurship over time (see Carter and Ram, 2003; 
Rosa, 1998; Rosa et al., 2014), particularly since it is very unlikely that the portfolio 
entrepreneurship process will follow a stable and linear path. Indeed, the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunities is naturally linked to high uncertainty and risk (Venkataraman, 
1997); consequently, exit and even failure are central features of entrepreneurship (Shepherd, 
2003). Thus, business portfolios can be reasonably assumed to follow “natural” economic cycles 
with phases of growth and decline (DeTienne and Chirico, 2013; Michael-Tsabari et al., 2014) 
and paths of expansion (e.g., acquisitions) and contraction (e.g., divestments) (Iacobucci and 
Rosa, 2010; Rosa et al., 2005). However, prior research has not investigated portfolio 
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entrepreneurship in times of declining performance (cf. Rosa, 1998); in particular, there is a clear 
lack of knowledge about the existence and nature of exit strategies related to (family) business 
portfolios. Addressing this gap is valuable and is in line with the call of Carter and Ram (2003) 
to investigate the context (e.g., the family) and the circumstances (e.g., declining situations) of 
portfolio entrepreneurship in greater detail.  
Business exit 
Business exit generally refers to “the process by which the founders… leave the firm they helped 
to create, thereby removing themselves, in varying degree, from the primary ownership and 
decision-making structure of the firm” (DeTienne, 2010: 203). Although a significant amount of 
research has focused on new venture creation, exit is a crucial event in the entrepreneurial 
process (DeTienne, 2010). Indeed, business exit is a common phenomenon, particularly in times 
of declining performance (Berry, 2010), and performance is an important determinant of exit 
routes, strategies, and processes (Wennberg et al., 2010). The dynamics of business exit have 
been studied by a range of scholars in the strategy (Burgelman, 1994), entrepreneurship 
(Wennberg et al., 2010), organization (Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985; Feldman, 2013), and 
family business (Dehlen et al., 2014; Kammerlander, 2014) literature. 
Among scholars who have investigated exit modes, there is ambiguity with respect to the 
understanding of business exit—that is, whether the term refers to entrepreneurs exiting a firm or 
a firm exiting the market (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001). Firms and entrepreneurs often exit 
simultaneously, for example, in the case of a firm’s liquidation (Wennberg et al., 2010). In such 
a situation, a firm ceases to exist, and its assets are sold separately to third parties (Mitchell, 
1994). In a business sale, in contrast, a firm is sold as an ongoing concern to a third party (e.g., a 
nonfamily actor), who takes over full ownership rights of the firm’s assets and management 
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responsibilities. Accordingly, the firm continues its operations, albeit under different ownership 
and management (Decker and Mellewigt, 2007). In general, the literature has developed multiple 
conceptualizations and definitions of exit types and modes, such as voluntary versus involuntary 
exit (cf. Justo et al., 2015), liquidation, sale, IPO, merger, acquisition, and succession (Coad, 
2013; DeTienne et al., 2015; Wennberg et al., 2010). Other researchers have identified different 
motivations for exit, such as retirement, the absence of a successor, and financial distress 
(Dehlen et al., 2014; Ronstadt, 1986; Shepherd, 2003), and have revealed the forces that drive 
strategic business exit (Burgelman, 1994) or have shown what facilitates owners’ intent to 
redirect, renew, and restructure their resources (Salvato et al., 2010).  
Regarding the concept of exit, with few exceptions (e.g., Sarasvathy et al., 2013), research on 
business exit has primarily focused on entrepreneurial exit from a single venture3 and has largely 
overlooked the fact that some entrepreneurs or business families undergo an exit process several 
times while managing their portfolio of businesses (MacMillan, 1986; Ucbasaran et al., 2006). 
Indeed, as explained by Wennberg and DeTienne (2014: 6), “none” of the various studies on 
entrepreneurial exit has taken “into account that an individual might run several firms 
concurrently as a portfolio entrepreneur.” This lack of research is regrettable because business 
portfolio management that includes the exit of satellite firms is a common phenomenon (Akhter, 
2016 ; DeTienne and Chirico, 2013). Moreover, note that business exit, particularly in the 
portfolio context, is not necessarily synonymous with “failure”; instead, it can be a wise 
entrepreneurial decision or even a sign of success (cf. Justo et al., 2015; Wennberg and 
DeTienne, 2014). Specifically, exit constitutes a promising value-creating strategy (DeTienne, 
2010) because it can lead to novel opportunities and enhance not only longevity and success 
                                                     
3Similarly, the extensive literature on divestitures has largely focused on why and how firms divest firm operations or business 
units, with poor performance being the main driver (cf. Berry 2010; Chang & Singh 1999; Burgelman 1994; Chang 1996). 
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(Salvato et al., 2010) but also family wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2012a) 
while allowing the entrepreneur or the family to redeploy their resources in different ways 
(DeTienne, 2010; Lieberman et al., 2016). In sum, there is a lack of understanding regarding 
whether, why, and how a business family responds to declining performance with particular exit 
strategies and how such actions relate to its potential long-term enduring entrepreneurship. As 
shown below, social identity theory is a promising theoretical lens to address these research gaps.  
Social identity theory  
The basic claim of social identity theory is that individuals who identify themselves with 
particular social groups, such as a family business, favor those groups (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; 
Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1982). Social identity refers to the groups to which one belongs 
(Chirico et al., forthcoming) and arises because individuals classify themselves and others into 
social categories (Turner et al., 1987). These classifications enable individuals both to make 
sense of their social environment and to define themselves in relation to others (Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989; Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). Social identity theory is particularly relevant in 
the family firm context for several reasons.  
First, the family’s long-term involvement and the common practice of including the family’s 
name in that of the business enhance its members’ identification with the family firm as their 
social group; indeed, evidence shows that business families strongly identify with their firm 
(Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). Such identification is often a function of the family’s needs 
and demands (Miller et al., 2011) such that the business becomes an extension of the family and 
its members (Chirico et al., forthcoming). By identifying themselves with the business, the 
family comes to define itself in terms of a perceived social group or category (Mael and 
Ashforth, 1992). Nevertheless, individuals can have multiple identities because they may identify 
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with multiple social groups (Hogg and Terry, 2014), and because these multiple identities are 
applicable to the family firm context, family firms represent two distinct institutions — the 
family and the business— that have different identities (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013; 
Shepherd and Haynie, 2009).  
Second, strong identification leads to attitudinal and behavioral consequences and responses. 
For instance, family members’ collective identity affects their decision-making processes by 
favoring the family’s interest and maximizing the family’s value over other shareholders’ wealth 
(Cannella et al., 2015; Sundaramurthy and Kreiner, 2008). Furthermore, family firms generally 
have a long time horizon and strive for reputation and transgenerational ownership (Deephouse 
and Jaskiewicz, 2013). Importantly, family identification produces significant psychic income, 
which is referred to as “socioemotional wealth” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), and this 
noneconomic benefit may direct owners to prioritize reputation and transgenerational ownership 
over profit maximization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Zellweger et al., 2012a). The extant 
research further acknowledges the influence of the intersection between family and business 
identities on firms’ sustainability and performance (Habbershon et al., 2003).  
Importantly, strong identification can also affect exit strategies in business portfolios. For 
instance, family owners may show concern about preserving family identity when embarking on 
the exit process. This concern is a result of the sense of attachment and belongingness to some 
particular groups that shape the behavior of individuals regarding, for instance, whether to adopt 
a particular divesting strategy (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). Family firms are indeed depicted 
as commitment-intensive organizations: family members harbor a strong sense of emotional 
attachment to the business (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008). 
Thus, business families are often conservative with respect to divesting strategies (DeTienne and 
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Chirico, 2013) because exit may lead to a loss of the socioemotional endowment that affects 
one’s identity (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In sum, the use of social identity theory is appropriate 
in the business family context because business families normally exhibit a high level of 
identification with their business or portfolio of businesses, which in turn affects their decision 
making and behavior (and, ultimately, the endurance of their business portfolio). 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research design and setting  
Given the limited understanding of exit strategies in family business portfolios in times of 
declining performance, we applied an exploratory qualitative research approach based on a 
multiple case study design. As described in greater detail in our analysis section, we followed a 
three-step procedure to analyze the cases whereby we combined two different types of analytical 
techniques (cf. Smith, 2014). In steps 1 and 3, we applied a multiple detailed case-study method 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009, 2011). Multiple case studies permit a comparison within and 
across cases in order to create a full picture of the events and phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 2009, 2011). Moreover, multiple case studies are specifically adopted to gain insights into 
the unexplored research phenomenon in which research questions on how and why can be 
addressed (Edmondson and McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). Put differently, we used this 
approach to identify emerging empirical patterns. In step 2, to build theory, we identified the 
underlying theoretical reasons for the observed patterns by relying on the justifications offered 
for decisions in the raw data (Langley 1999) and by following the inductive theory building 
procedures outlined in Gioia et al. (2013). Such an approach is most appropriate for the purpose 
and nature of our study and is commonly applied in recent qualitative research (e.g., Salvato and 
Corbetta, 2013; Smith, 2014). The overall goal of these abovementioned steps was to understand 
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a complex reality (i.e., the exit process in family business portfolios), which demands the use of 
multiple, complementary perspectives (Langley, 1999; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). 
In our study, the personal relationships of one of the authors with most of the interviewed 
business families along with his knowledge of the local context were vital for obtaining access to 
reliable data4. For instance, in addition to using existing personal relationships and direct 
contacts, the first author also gathered information and impressions about further potential cases 
in the relevant local areas before actually making contact. Specifically, we selected our cases in 
two steps. A first round of field visits was conducted from December 2010 to January 2011 and 
was solely dedicated to identifying potential cases (business families owning a business 
portfolio) and establishing contacts. Next, we started the data collection by interviewing the 
Directors/founders/owners of twelve family firm portfolios. Based on the analysis of these first-
stage interviews, we selected six cases with family business portfolios in which at least one exit 
had occurred. This procedure allowed us to sample information-rich cases, which provided us 
with the opportunity to study our phenomenon of interest in great depth. These six cases included 
49 businesses and allowed us to investigate 20 business exits.  
Our focus on Pakistan is justified because of the significant presence of family firm portfolios 
in emerging economies (Jaffe and Lane, 2004; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007), particularly in the 
Pakistan region (Zaidi and Aslam, 2006). Indeed, almost all of Pakistan’s unlisted firms are 
family firms, and “approximately 80% of the listed companies on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
have family involvement or are indirectly affiliated with a large business family” (Zaidi and 
Aslam, 2006: 1). Additionally, Pakistan is regarded as very entrepreneurial; a recent study 
                                                     
4 To honor privacy agreements and to guarantee anonymity for both the companies and the informants, the real names of the 
cases and the people are kept confidential. This approach also encouraged the respondents to be more open when answering the 
interview questions and relating their stories. 
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ranked Pakistan 4th in the world in entrepreneurship in terms of efficiency and innovation (Dutta 
and Lanvin, 2011). Nevertheless, entrepreneurs experience a very hostile environment 
characterized by uncertainty and rapid changes that imply the likely occurrence of declining 
performance and the corresponding need of exit strategies. For instance, a quick glimpse of 
Pakistan since 9/11 shows that in addition to security threats and a high number of casualties, the 
country has significantly struggled on the economic front (Acharya et al., 2009). As noted by 
Afzal et al. (2012: 196), “Islamabad faces a crisis that erodes [people’s] options. Investors are 
afraid of investing in Pakistan due to instability.” The country’s instability and the energy crisis 
have led to lower foreign investment and lower business activity. Nevertheless, Pakistani 
entrepreneurs have shown considerable resilience during this long crisis period (Amanullah, 
2012). Recent figures from the World Bank and the United Nations favor Pakistan in terms of 
the overall growth rate and improvement of the security situation after a prolonged economic 
drought. Accordingly, it is interesting to study the exit phenomenon from a contextual point of 
view (Ucbasaran et al., 2001; Welter, 2011).  
Data sources  
In our study, we adopted a multi-source data-collection tactic (see Table 1) to capture the process 
over a certain period (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven, 1992) and allow data triangulation. The 
primary data sources were interviews, and the additional sources we used for the purpose of 
triangulation (Miles and Huberman, 1994) were observations, informal discussions, company 
websites, company brochures, and informal telephone follow-ups. We mainly gathered the data 
through 39 in-depth interviews with family owners and managers, with each interview lasting 
between 60 and 120 minutes. In addition, there were four field visits from December 2010 to 
January 2014, which helped us conduct follow-up interviews.  
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For the interviews, we adopted open- and closed-ended interview strategies (cf. Bingham and 
Haleblian, 2012; Langley and Abdallah, 2011). For the early rounds, a more open-ended 
interview strategy was employed in which respondents were first asked to describe the family 
firm’s history and background information chronologically in line with the narrative style 
(Etherington, 2004; Polkinghorne, 1995). For instance, for the background information and 
history, the interviewees were typically asked to describe the firm from its inception (e.g., how 
was the firm started, and how did its historical development unfold chronologically?). After 
reviewing the described events, the respondents were asked whether all of the important aspects 
had been covered (e.g., Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). The respondents were then asked to 
describe each exit event chronologically. Because there were multiple exits, we highlighted and 
emphasized the period when each exit started; for instance, we asked the following questions: 
When and why did the family exit the firm? What were the reasons that some businesses were 
divested and others were not? In the next step, we reviewed the exit timelines and asked whether 
anything remained uncovered. Finally, we asked questions in the courtroom style, meaning we 
asked direct questions related to exit (Langley and Abdallah, 2011). For instance, we asked the 
following questions: Why did the family opt to shut down this particular satellite business? Why 
did the family opt to sell this particular business? If the family had not experienced declining 
performance, would it have done something different? Why did the family want to re-enter the 
exited satellite business? In the follow-up rounds, we also asked questions about family and 
business harmony: Are the family and business thought of as one closely related entity or as two 
different entities? What about the satellite businesses?  
We thus determined repeated exit strategies (for this term, see also DeTienne and Chirico, 
2013) along with the main underlying driving forces from the informants’ responses that 
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emerged through the interview process. Relying on multiple sources of data collection and 
asking different questions (i.e., open- and close-ended) helped our data triangulation and thus 
improved the reliability of the responses.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Analysis  
The analytical process was not linear but iterative because we constantly moved back and forth 
from data to the theory to improve insights and generalizability (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Van Maanen et al., 2007). The three steps mentioned above are introduced in more detail below.  
Step 1. All of the interviews were conducted in Urdu and later translated into English.5 The 
interview documents were synthesized for each firm, leading to the development of individual 
case narratives that allowed us to obtain an initial understanding of the cases and to identify the 
relevant issues. This step of developing the case narratives is in line with previous studies that 
adopted similar analytical approaches (e.g., Rindova et al., 2011; Smith, 2014); moreover, it 
allowed us to follow each case’s exit process chronologically. Throughout the process of 
analysis, we continued to update our case narratives with new information emerging from the 
data and identified key events, actions, and milestones in the family business portfolios that were 
linked to the process and type of exit through a “temporal back tracking strategy” (Langley, 
1999). Accordingly, the insights that emerged from the case narratives helped us in our 
subsequent analysis. For example, we found that business families decided between shutting 
down and selling a satellite business in face of declining performance. Consequently, we focused 
on those specific issues and obtained primary insights into the cases before we embarked on 
                                                     
5 The translation process and the final translations themselves were checked by an independent bilingual researcher 
for correctness.  
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coding the interview data (step 2) to explore the underlying reasons and before we confirmed our 
insights within each case and compared them across cases (step 3).  
Step 2. To code, structure, and order the interview data, we followed the procedure that is 
outlined in Gioia et al. (2013) and is composed of three sub-steps. This procedure has been 
applied in numerous other recent studies (e.g., Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a; Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b; 
Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). We began by coding the first-order data and using the text of the 
interviews as coding units. We labeled the sentences and paragraphs (textual expressions) with 
the language used in the text or simply descriptive phrases. Later, we began to make connections 
between the first-order codes to develop second-order themes by selecting the codes that 
occurred more frequently and then collapsed the primary codes into a more conceptual level. 
Finally, we identified the overarching theoretical dimensions to develop our theory—namely, an 
identity-based motivating factor and three contingency factors as drivers of the shutting down 
versus selling decision. As an example, when a business family described how the family and the 
business were inextricably intertwined, this was given the primary code “family and business as 
same thing”. In the next step of the analysis, this primary code “family and business as same 
thing” as well as the primary codes “family name and legacy” and “recognition with the family” 
were collapsed to the second-order theme “family and satellite business identity fit”. The 
corresponding aggregated theoretical dimension, in turn, is the “identity-based motivating 
factor”. Figure 1 summarizes the first-order concepts and the researchers’ interpretation of the 
second-order themes or secondary codes, which ultimately lead to the aggregated dimensions. 
The aggregated theoretical dimensions serve as the basis for the emergent framework. 
Although it is generally difficult to apply common readability and validity measures to 
naturalistic research, “it is still important to show why the findings of a qualitative study are 
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representative of the phenomenon of interest” (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007: 61). Thus, in line 
with best practices in case study research (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Van Maanen, 1979), we 
ensured reliability in our process in several ways. First, our research is longitudinal in nature 
because we followed the cases over time and collected both retrospective and real-time data, 
which enabled greater understanding of the phenomenon (Pettigrew, 1990). Second, our 
analytical process was undertaken by multiple researchers who independently analyzed the data. 
In this regard, there was 95 percent agreement among the researchers when assigning labels, 
which is well above the suggested threshold of 70 percent (Cohen, 1960; Kreiner et al., 2009). 
Third, we conducted code-recode checks on randomly selected interviews (e.g., Hannah and 
Robertson, 2015; Miles and Huberman, 1994) in which we compared our paper-based coding 
with a re-coding procedure performed in NViVO (cf. Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). With this 
procedure, we achieved the intra-coding reliability standards devised by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), thus increasing our confidence in the analytical process. Fourth, we compared and 
checked our interview data with other data sources to apply data triangulation (Eisenhardt, 
1989), which is important to confirm both our own experiences and our observed interpretations 
(Van Maanen, 1979). In some cases, we were able to check and confirm our findings through 
other sources of data such as observations, websites, archival data [websites, news articles], and 
knowledge about the local context of the cases. Finally, through in-person follow-up interviews 
and Skype and phone calls with our informants, we ensured that our data interpretation was 
actually correct  (Nag et al., 2007). We continued this process until each additional interview 
confirmed instead of added more information to help us reach a threshold level of additional 
relevant information. This process ensured that the findings were obtained through a rigorous 
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procedure that made full use of the richness and complexity of the data (cf. Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2007). 
Step 3. In the next phase, we evaluated each case individually through a within-case analysis. 
Once we were confident that we had a good understanding of each case, we moved on to the 
cross-case analysis. We also followed the process of replication logic to determine whether the 
cases confirmed or refuted the emerging findings. The cross-case analysis helped us look for 
similarities and differences among the cases. For instance, after first comparing the cases, we 
grouped the cases according to their shutdown and sell activities and ownership (see Table 2). 
Once this comparison was conducted with all 20 exits, we moved on to further group the cases 
according to their identity fit, recycling intention, restart intention, and increasing performance 
decline. For instance, for identity fit, we categorized the cases into high and low, whereby 
shutting down tended to occur when identity fit was high and selling tended to occur when 
identity fit was low. Finally, the common themes led us to formulate analytical generalizations, 
to develop propositions, and to formulate our theoretical model later shown in Figure 2 (cf. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
FINDINGS AND PROPOSITIONS 
As outlined in the following sections, our study reveals unique insights into how business 
families respond to declining performance. Our key finding is that shutting down is a prevalent 
exit strategy because of an identity-based motivating factor, namely, the identity fit between the 
family and the satellite business. We further present evidence that a) the family’s goal of 
recycling the assets, b) the family’s goal of restarting the business at a later date, and c) the 
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increasing performance decline are important contingency factors in the relationship depicted 
above that therefore also influence shutdown versus selling decisions (see Figure 1 above for an 
overview). Table 3 summarizes the additional case evidence for the first-order data 
corresponding to each second-order theme. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Exit strategies in response to declining performance  
Exit research often examines exit from the perspective of selling or liquidating (Dehlen et al., 
2014). Interestingly, we find that in our sample of family business portfolios, business families 
may shut down a satellite business by temporarily closing operations instead of selling the 
business for financial gain. A good example is given by the Kasf family, which is involved in the 
construction business as its core/legacy business and has several satellite businesses in its 
portfolio. This case shows how the owning family of a family business portfolio reacts to 
declining performance by shutting down satellite businesses. The Director6 stated, “Our father 
has gone through a long struggle for this business, and he narrates his struggle to us and the 
people around us in a very positive sense. This motivates all of us to take care of what we have 
been given [legacy] and what we have founded [satellite businesses] and to preserve all of it as 
part of our family legacy.7” Consequently, the family shut down some satellite businesses as a 
first step: they closed the businesses’ operations so that they could mitigate losses. The Director 
further stated, “The name of our company is the abbreviation of the full name of our grandfather. 
                                                     
6 The “Directors” we refer to in different cases are all members of the owning family who are operationally leading 
the family business (owner-managers). As their official job titles, they use several different terms such as 
“managing partner”,  “managing director”, “executive director”, “CEO”, and others.  
7 Square brackets in quotes have been added by the authors for clarification about which businesses the respondents 
are talking about (i.e., the portfolio, legacy, or satellite) or to clarify the context of the meaning.  
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Our father said that he wanted to honor our grandfather through the work of our company. I 
believe it’s an emotional matter for our family, because the name means a lot to us…we had a 
strong motive to deal with the business decline through the closure [of the satellites], because it 
was more about preserving than earning in those difficult times.”  
The case of Lucky, which is involved in an agri-farming business as its core legacy business 
with five satellite businesses in its portfolio, provides further evidence of how the owning family 
of a family business portfolio can react to declining performance. Lucky’s Director stated, “Our 
family business was in hot water when we were not able to make profits with our newly invested 
greenhouses. The problem was that we had invested a lot, and the output was not meeting our 
required financial demands to accommodate for the losses.... For us, it was a matter of keeping 
things on track for both our family and the business.” Thus, the family shut down a satellite 
business as a first step; they closed their fish farm. Owner 1 reflected, “We were… not in favor of 
the idea that someone else would own our developed business [satellite]; why would we allow 
such a thing?” Similarly, the business families of Miral and Sunny also opted for shutdowns of 
their business satellites.  
These findings lead to several insights. First, on a general level, we see that exiting satellite 
firms is a common phenomenon when family business portfolios show declining performance. 
Second, as a main finding, there seems to be an exit mode that has been largely overlooked by 
the existing literature—switching off operations and retaining the firm’s assets. In some cases, 
business families seem to prefer this option even when selling is a viable and financially 
rewarding option.8 This finding is in line with the observation that business families’ decisions 
                                                     
8 To make a conscious choice between shutting down and selling a satellite business, both options must actually 
exist. We re-ensured that both options indeed existed for all of the investigated exit cases by carefully re-checking 
all available materials (e.g., reports, interview transcripts, and other sources). In some cases, we also re-contacted 
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may not be purely driven by financial considerations (cf. Kammerlander, 2014; Olson et al., 
2003). This evidence leads us to the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: The owning family of a family business portfolio that is experiencing 
declining performance may prefer to shut down a satellite firm instead of sell it. 
 
Shutting down versus selling: identity-based motivating factor 
Family and satellite business identity fit. We further explore why shutting down a satellite firm 
may be preferred to selling (and why sometimes it may not be). We find that a business family’s 
identification not only with its family business portfolio as a whole but also, and more 
specifically, with the satellite business drives this decision. An illustration in this regard is the 
Lucky family where the satellite businesses that the family owners shut down were started as 
extensions of their agri-farming family business. Both of the businesses—a brick kiln and a fish 
farm—were situated on their main farmland. When encountering a decline in performance, the 
owners decided to shut down the satellite businesses because, as Owner 2 of Lucky stated, “Our 
family always considers itself very strongly linked with our family business. Our recognition is 
because of our family business, and we take pride in it. My siblings and I were convinced that we 
were not going to allow someone else to work in the same fields.... Our family business is our 
identity, and we will not share it with someone else.” He also noted, “it was our plan from the 
start that we will not sell the fish farm because of our family’s strong attachment and 
identification with this particular secondary business […].” 
A similar example is that of the Sunny family in which the family’s brothers started a media 
business because of their infatuation with movie making. Owner 1 noted, “Surely, we didn’t 
want to sell those subsequent [satellite] businesses which we started, considering the close 
                                                                                                                                                                           
our informants to confirm that our corresponding interpretations were correct. In particular, we confirmed that all 
of the concerned satellite businesses still had some going concern value, meaning that the value of the business as 
a whole was higher than the value of its single assets. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this hint.  
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connection of those businesses with the family, because we can relate to ourselves. For instance, 
the media business was started by my elder brother [Director] and me…; we are both crazy 
about movie production and directing. It is like our baby, and we didn’t want it to be handled by 
someone else.” The Sunny family could indeed have sold the business not only because of its 
asset value but also because of its going concern value (i.e., it could have rented out the movies it 
had produced to regional movie theaters).  
Whereas the evidence illustrates that the Lucky, Kasf, Sunny, and Miral families shut down 
satellite firms because of a strong identity fit between the families and the satellite businesses, 
the business families did decide to sell other satellite firms (two satellite firms by Sunny and one 
by Miral). In these cases, the identity fit was perceived to be low. For instance, Sunny sold two 
of its satellite businesses: Design House [a branded cloth store, which was started by the family’s 
youngest son] and Restaurant. Director Sunny stated, “My youngest son started the design house 
as his first business, coming out of Arts College; however, he later lost interest and started 
spending more time in the distribution [legacy business].” The satellite business was primarily 
managed by a nonfamily manager. During the time of financial distress, the business family sold 
the business, which was active and situated in a very good location; thus, it had considerable 
sales value.  
Similarly, when the Miral family experienced difficulties in their legacy business, they opted 
to sell their dealership, which was run with a partner at the time of sale. Importantly, there was a 
controversy related to the business. Additionally, the business did not carry the name of the 
Miral family, and it was clear that the identity fit between the family and this business was low. 
Accordingly, to keep their name distant from the controversy, the owners decided to sell.  
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Additional related evidence can be found in the cases of Jami (mainly active in the 
construction business) and Pak (mainly active in the farming business), in which satellites were 
sold because of a lack of identity fit. For example, in times of declining performance, the 
Director of Jami stated, “We sold the subsequent businesses [3 in total] because that was the best 
possible way to respond…. We don’t feel that the businesses we sold will interfere with our 
recognition as a family because there is not a real match between our family business [mainly 
active in the construction business] and those subsequent businesses [satellites].” Similarly, Pak, 
which has farming as its main business activity, sold a rice mill and a small ice manufacturing 
unit during a decline (see Table 2). 
Collectively, our data reveal that when a strong identity fit between the family and a satellite 
business exists, the family tends to prefer the option of shutting down the satellite instead of the 
alternative option of selling it because the family is not willing to let go of the satellite business 
or to let someone else have it. In such a case, shutting down the business is viewed as a way to 
preserve the family identity and the family business portfolio; by contrast, selling the business 
would mean that part (if not all) of the family identity is lost. Conversely, when there is a weak 
identity fit, satellite businesses are more likely to be sold than to be shut down. This notion is 
supported by the fact that whereas there were 12 shutdowns and 8 sales, all of the satellites that 
were shut down were fully owned by the families; by contrast, 5 of the 8 satellites that were sold 
were not fully owned (see Table 2). This finding is significant to our reasoning because the 
literature has positively linked ownership levels to the level of identification (cf. Miller et al., 
2011; Rouse, 2015). Formally, we propose the following: 
Proposition 2: The stronger the identity fit between the owning family and a satellite 
business in a family business portfolio that is facing declining performance, the more 
likely the owning family will be to shut down the satellite instead of sell it.  
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Shutting down versus selling: contingency factors  
Recycling. Our analysis offers evidence that the decision either to shut down or to sell a satellite 
business, which is driven by identity-based considerations, is contingent on a business family’s 
goal to recycle the assets—that is, to temporarily shift the firm’s resources (e.g., tangible assets, 
human and financial capital) to other businesses. A good example in this regard is how the 
family owners of Kasf have chosen to shut down a satellite business in order to counter a 
business decline. The Director stated, “Our family is known for not selling anything. My father 
thinks that there is a value in everything that you can use or recycle. So we came out of the 
workshop business [satellite]…and instead used the land for real estate…. This may be the way 
to manage from a long-term perspective, perhaps also to keep the connection with the [divested] 
businesses alive.” Because the workshop business is strongly linked to the family’s identity, this 
statement shows how the goal to recycle assets can enhance identity fit-related considerations 
with regard to shutting down versus selling. Whenever the owners of Kasf experienced difficult 
situations, they refrained from selling businesses that they felt were part of their family identity 
and heredity, particularly when they strived to redirect the corresponding assets to potentially 
more promising businesses. Such a situation has also recently been observed by the national 
media, which has highlighted that the Kasf family did not sell their businesses even in the face of 
business decline. 
Similarly, in the Sunny case, the business family shut down some satellites that they 
considered to be part of their identity to redirect resources and turn around the declining 
business. When reflecting about how the family responded in difficult situations, the Director 
said, “The reasons we took action in the form of closing down were because, first, we didn’t want 
to let go of our businesses [satellite] and, second, we have always created some opportunities 
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out of failures [through recycling resources]. The motivation that you need during the declining 
phase is that you create opportunities and not just focus on trying to get out of the situation at 
that particular time.” This statement indicates that the main motivation to not let go, mainly 
because of identity considerations, is enhanced by the intended pursuit of a recycling strategy.  
Similarly, the Director of Miral stated, “We did take advantage of the situation by closing the 
operations [satellite] and diverting all of our focus to the main activity [legacy]…. That seemed 
to be the right strategy at that moment, which also allowed us to be attached to our business 
[legacy].” Here, the recycling approach also helps families pursue identity-related motives in the 
context of the shutting down versus selling decision. Related evidence is also found in the Lucky 
case (see Table 2).  
In sum, we find that the business families have a considerable desire to shut down instead of 
sell satellite businesses (while not liquidating or selling assets) in order to be able to redirect 
these assets to turn around the business portfolio. This situation resembles what Mason and 
Harrison (2006) term “entrepreneurial recycling.” Accordingly, the goal to recycle those assets is 
part of a “turnaround” strategy that can contribute to the long-term enduring success of the 
business portfolio. More specifically, the recycling goal seems to enhance identity-induced 
behaviors (i.e., shutting down instead of selling). We note that social identity arguments suggest 
that members of a group with strong identification adopt practices and make choices that benefit 
their firms (Cannella et al., 2015). Indeed, they shape their behavioral responses toward 
collective long-term goals and activities congruent with their identities (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989; Ellemers et al., 2004). This relationship between identity considerations and shutting down 
versus selling as a beneficial behavioral response during declining performance, in turn, seems to 
be stronger when the goal to recycle assets is present. Thus, we formally propose the following: 
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Proposition 3: In a family business portfolio that is experiencing declining performance, 
the goal of recycling the assets of a satellite business strengthens the positive relationship 
between identity fit (owning family and satellite business) and the likelihood of shutting 
down versus selling the satellite. 
 
Restarting. The identity fit-based decision to shut down or sell a satellite business is also 
affected by family owners’ goal to re-enter the business later. An illustration in this regard is the 
Kasf family, which is involved in the construction business as its main activity. During a decline 
in its construction business, other areas of its portfolio were affected, such as their hotel business 
and their heavy mechanical workshop. The Kasf family always very strongly identified with its 
hotel business, for instance, which had been one of their father’s first diversifications. They then 
decided to shut down both their hotel business and the workshop. As the Director noted, this 
decision was strengthened by the family’s intentions to re-start the businesses: “Our family never 
sold any business that had ever been started…. We had high hopes and interest to go back to the 
hotel business and the workshop business…; our decision to shut down… was made with the 
strong intention to re-open.” Importantly, as in all of the exit cases investigated, the family 
would have been able to sell the businesses; the hotel, for example, is at a prime location on one 
of the main roads in the city of Rawalpindi. When the family exited the hotel business, they 
rented out the property for a few years. This example illustrates how the goal to restart a satellite 
firm can reinforce identity-based shutting down versus selling considerations. Indeed, the Kasf 
family restarted both businesses at a later time (e.g., the hotel after a complete renovation and the 
workshop on a smaller in-house scale).  
Another example is the Miral family, which strongly identified with its restaurant business. 
This is mainly because the name of the restaurant is also the name of a heritage area in the city 
where the Miral family first settled. In addition, the public associated the restaurant’s name with 
the Miral family name. The family owners decided to shut down the restaurant in a time of 
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declining performance even though they could have sold it due to the restaurant’s heritage value. 
As the Director noted, “[…] we were not ready to give up; rather, we were all set to fight—at 
that time, our friends and other people around us thought that it was foolish what we were 
doing…. There were many reasons not to sell, especially when you want to take it forward.” 
Here, identity was also not the only relevant consideration. As the Director explained, “We do 
intend to restart them [all of the businesses that were closed down] as soon as we can control the 
situation. […] My goal of running the traditional food restaurant is still ‘alive’, and I am hopeful 
that I will restart again soon.” The intention to restart here is a means to further strengthen 
identity fit-based motivations in regard to shutting down versus selling.  
Similarly, the Lucky family strongly identified with its fish farm and brick kiln businesses. 
According to Owner 3, “It was our thought out intention to close down the businesses [satellites] 
and wait for the things to calm down…; in the meantime, we were working to settle the debt with 
the help of family and friends…; the vision of diversifying into different businesses carried on by 
re-starting the fish farming business”. Thus, the business family decided to shut down because 
of identity reasons; this decision was fostered by the family’s willingness to come back to the 
businesses and to re-start again.  
In sum, our cases show that the intention to restart a satellite business at some point in the 
future is an important contingency factor of the identity fit/shutting down versus selling 
relationship in times of declining performance. Accordingly, the goal to restart a satellite 
business in the future may imply some form of additional “anticipatory identification” (Rouse, 
2015: 24), with the business family showing an even stronger identification-based motivation 
logic toward the choice of shutting down versus selling. The previous literature states that 
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decline or failure affects entrepreneurs’ behavior in two ways, either fight or flight (Calvet et al., 
2008); in our cases, we clearly identified the “fight” mode. Formally stated, we thus propose:  
Proposition 4: In a family business portfolio that is experiencing declining performance, 
the goal of restarting a satellite business strengthens the positive relationship between 
identity fit (owning family and satellite business) and the likelihood of shutting down 
versus selling the satellite. 
 
Increasing decline in performance. Our analysis provides evidence of another important 
contingency factor in the depicted main relationship: the increasing decline in performance (see 
also Brauer, 2006). Indeed, family business scholars often note that family owners manifest a 
high degree of risk-taking behavior in difficult situations (Chrisman et al., 2011). Such behavior 
is explained by family owners’ strong identification with the business, which shapes their risk-
taking attitude and behavior (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2011).  
For example, in the case of the Lucky family, the family first shut down its fish farm. 
However, the situation did not improve, and when its performance declined further, the family 
shut down another satellite (i.e., the brick kiln) instead of selling it. The Director explained, “In 
those days, we would discuss possible actions a lot because the [portfolio] business was not 
going well [increasingly worse] …, and the increased complexity, uncertainty, and strong 
instability of the market were not helping at all! … I was feeling that with the increasing decline, 
we were becoming more stringent and robust in our actions towards not selling off our 
subsequent [satellite] businesses, so first we closed down all of the fish farming operations, and 
then we agreed to come out of the brick kiln. The focus completely shifted to the agri-farming.” 
This statement demonstrates that the effects of identity considerations on the likelihood that 
shutting down is preferred to selling a satellite firm are amplified by the increasing decline in 
performance in the business portfolio.  
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Similar evidence is found in the case studies of Miral, Kasf, and Sunny (see Table 4). For 
example, in the case of the Miral family, the family owners had to exit from several satellite 
businesses because of increasing decline in performance caused by a difficult market situation. 
As the Director explained, “Investments in new businesses [satellites] triggered our business 
decline: the dairy plant gave us the real shock. Our newly started dairy plant ran into trouble 
[declining performance levels that were worse in relation to the declining performance of the 
portfolio].” With the declining performance, the family owners started to shut down their other 
businesses in the portfolio to protect their legacy business. As stated by the Director, 
“Increasingly low performance [of the family business] was leading us to be stronger, and our 
response was in the form of shutdowns…. I am not upset; instead, I have become stronger 
because the family is with me, and we all believe in our family business…. We take it as a 
challenge for the present and the future...; after discussing and obtaining support from the 
family, I decided to close the …[satellite] businesses.” In addition, selling these satellite 
businesses would have been possible here. The settled export business, for instance, had the 
same name as the Miral family and thus had considerable market value owing to the 
corresponding reputation and goodwill.  
These findings are important because the existing literature generally suggests that 
increasingly poor performance is an important factor that motivates an owner to exit a business 
through a sale or, in the worst-case scenario, a liquidation (Brauer, 2006; Chang, 1996). In our 
cases, however, the families became more committed (escalation) to close down operations and 
retain all firm assets instead of selling the businesses even when the decline was becoming 
worse. This finding is in line with the argument that business families take greater risks when 
their emotional endowment (identity) is increasingly threatened (cf. Ashforth et al., 2016; 
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Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Put differently, tougher situations increase family owners’ 
commitment to their business assets and resources (Chirico et al., forthcoming; Salvato et al., 
2010). In a similar vein, some family business scholars suggest that family owners feel 
increasingly aware and obliged to retain and revitalize a business in more difficult situations 
(Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012; Lumpkin et al., 2010). Implicit in this line of reasoning is the 
observation that family owners view their businesses as something greater than a simple 
financial tool for profit maximization and that identification reasons drive such owners’ strategic 
decisions. Consequently, business families who are experiencing difficult situations find 
themselves increasingly eager to avoid the selling option at all costs while committing to shut 
down satellite businesses. Taken the above considerations together, we propose the following: 
Proposition 5: In a family business portfolio, increasing decline in performance 
strengthens the positive relationship between identity fit (owning family and satellite 
business) and the likelihood of shutting down versus selling the satellite. 
 
The relationships that we propose between the different variables are shown in the figure below. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
Our study aimed to investigate enduring entrepreneurship through exit strategies in family 
business portfolios experiencing declining performance. The analysis of a sample of six family 
business portfolios with 20 exits from Pakistan led to two main contributions.  
First, we revealed that shutting down a satellite business (instead of selling it for financial 
gain) is a prevalent exit strategy in family business portfolios. Specifically, we showed that a 
business family may indeed prefer to “shut down” a satellite portfolio firm (i.e., close down 
operations and keep all of the firm’s assets) rather than sell it to a third party – even if the latter 
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was an available option and would have enabled the family to generate immediate financial 
revenues that could have been used for other purposes. Second, we illuminate the drivers behind 
this decision. By using a social identity theory perspective we discovered that the likelihood of 
shutting down versus selling a satellite firm is higher when there is a high degree of fit between 
the family and the satellite business identity. In addition, we find that the goals of recycling the 
resources and of restarting the satellite business in the future as well as increasing decline in 
performance are important contingency factors in the above-stated relationship. These 
contributions have important implications for several streams of literature.  
Implications for portfolio entrepreneurship research 
Our study affects research on portfolio entrepreneurship both within and beyond the family 
business domain because it demonstrates that studies which focus mainly on how and why 
business portfolios are created (for an overview, see Carter & Ram 2003) neglect the various 
multi-faceted and rather unexplored dynamics that occur in later stages of portfolio 
entrepreneurship. While research acknowledges that successful portfolio entrepreneurship 
involves renewal and constant entry into and exit from business activities (Dess et al., 2003; 
DeTienne and Chirico, 2013), more research about later-stage portfolio entrepreneurship 
dynamics is needed. Specifically, we encourage portfolio entrepreneurship scholars to shift a bit 
away from “why and how” business portfolios are built and to focus more on research about 
engaging in exit in a portfolio of businesses in general, shutting down or selling satellite firms in 
particular, recycling resources, and restarting satellite firms. This is especially interesting during 
difficult times when the success or failure of a business portfolio are determined.  
Relatedly, we raise scholars’ awareness that the decision making of business families that own 
a business portfolio does not always follow a purely profit-maximizing approach. The “if we 
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can’t have it, then no one should” pattern that we identify – manifested in the decision to shut 
down a satellite business even though selling it would enable the family to generate immediate 
and higher financial returns overall (see also Decker and Mellewigt, 2007; Wennberg et al., 
2010) – contrasts with the classic profit-maximizing model. This implies that the factors that 
affect this decision should be investigated further. A particularly promising avenue is to examine 
the interplay between identity-related “non-rational” reasons and more economic “rational” 
reasons. Specifically, although family owners can be implicitly assumed to likely make strategic 
decisions independent of financial considerations, the existence of identification and emotional 
reasons does not imply that family firms are generally self-sacrificial and that they ignore 
financial issues completely (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Put differently, it is 
unlikely that the decision to shut down instead of sell a satellite business is solely driven by 
identity considerations. Family firms are “more likely to bear the cost and uncertainty involved 
in pursuing certain actions, driven by a belief that the risks that such actions entail are 
counterbalanced by noneconomic benefits rather than potential financial gains” (Berrone et al., 
2012: 261). Future research should thus investigate how identity-related rationales interact with 
particularly relevant economic factors (e.g., market value of assets, going concern values, 
financial market conditions). Relatedly, it would be interesting to explore whether there is a 
“price tag” that can be put on identity fit considerations: how large does the financial value that 
is foregone by shutting down instead of selling have to be so that the business family decides to 
sell despite any identity fit considerations? 
Furthermore, with our identification of identity fit as a main driving force of the shutting 
down versus selling decision and three contingency factors we demonstrate that exit decisions 
and strategies in family business portfolios are relatively complex. This opens up several 
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promising research avenues. To start with, each of the contingency factors deserves further 
research attention. For instance, as discussed, we found that identification motives become 
stronger when the situation is more difficult. Because this might be context driven to a certain 
extent—as the post-9/11 situation has dramatically changed Pakistan’s dynamics—we call for 
further investigation of the role of declining performance in other settings and countries while 
considering the extent to which the portfolio’s survival—and thus socioemotional wealth (SEW; 
see Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) —are threatened explicitly. Furthermore, we found evidence in 
the Kasf workshop example that both the goals to recycle and to restart are present. This 
indicates that the relationship between identity fit and the likelihood of shutting down versus 
selling might be affected by more than one contingency factor at the same time. Clearly, further 
in-depth research is needed here. In addition, there might be other contingency factors which we 
have not captured in our study. Possible factors worth investigating may include the size and 
performance of the various units, the resource allocation and relatedness between the core and 
satellite businesses, emotional attachment (and its link to identification), and external factors. 
Regarding the latter, some of our cases (i.e., Miral and Kasf) provide preliminary evidence that 
the level of environmental uncertainty, that is, the complexity and change emanating from the 
external environment (Keats and Hitt, 1988), may also drive the shutting down versus selling 
decision, with family owners tending to increasingly opt for shutdown instead of selling as 
environmental uncertainty increases. Relatedly, scholars could also investigate environmental 
elements such as institutional voids as potentially important boundary conditions. 
Implications for entrepreneurial exit research 
We impact research on exit modes (Chang and Singh, 1999; Wennberg, 2008; Wennberg et al., 
2011) by identifying “shutting down” as an additional type of exit that has been largely 
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overlooked in the literature so far. While there is considerable anecdotal evidence regarding this 
particular behavior of firms and firm owners, our work is the first to theoretically and empirically 
study this phenomenon. Specifically, we describe “shutting down” as a situation in which a 
firm’s operations are “switched off” and assets are retained, leaving open the option to “switch 
on” the firm and to use the assets again in the future. Thus, “shutdown” can be interpreted as a 
temporary pause in a firm’s operations. This implies that future research on exit modes should 
consider this exit type; otherwise the corresponding conceptual or empirical models might be 
underspecified.  
Furthermore, our study affects general research on exit motivations (Dehlen et al., 2014; 
Kammerlander, 2014). Besides highlighting the relevance of both emotional and rational reasons 
for exit decisions, something which previous research has not addressed in sufficient depth 
(Wong et al. 2006), we also offer nuanced insights into how business families make 
corresponding decisions depending on increasing performance decline. As a situation becomes 
more difficult (higher declining performance), business families tend to show an escalated 
commitment in the divested satellite businesses. This finding is intriguing because most of the 
recent family firm literature argues that economic considerations take precedence over emotional 
(including identification) concerns when a firm experiences economic hazards (see Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011 for a review). For example, Gomez‐Mejia et al. (2010: 232) argue and find that 
family firms are more likely to engage in diversification as firm performance decreases; 
diversification and related financial considerations become “a higher priority than the 
preservation of SEW.” Our study shows that identification motives become stronger when they 
are paired with greater performance hazard. This implies that on the one hand, scholars should 
not take the previous findings in the literature for granted; actually, the opposite might also be 
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true. On the other hand, there is a clear and strong need for further research about the general 
circumstances and conditions under which either economic or emotional (e.g., SEW) 
considerations dominate business families’ decision-making. There might be several important 
contingency factors to explore, such as for instance family constellations, family and business 
values, or risk preferences.  
Implications for research on long-term success and transgenerational entrepreneurship 
Scholars in the corresponding fields should keep in mind that a key to long-term generation-
spanning (i.e., enduring) entrepreneurial success of business families is how they may overcome 
declining performance in their business portfolio, for instance through the specific exit strategies 
that we have identified. Specifically, we highlight how shutdown decisions may assist the 
recovery and endurance of the business portfolio, fostered by the intention to later recycle or 
restart a portfolio business. In other words, we shed some light on the pressing question of how 
some business families, particularly when they own a portfolio of businesses, survive periods of 
declining performance and remain successful in the long term. Future studies should better link 
the turnaround strategy of shutting down satellite firms to long-term success by investigating the 
long-term performance implications of this strategy through a longitudinal, quantitative 
approach.  
Implications for practice 
Finally, our study offers implications for practice. Family business practitioners can benefit from 
our work because we show a promising and unique way how family firms can respond to 
business decline and ensure enduring entrepreneurship. Indeed, shutting down a satellite firm 
instead of selling it should definitely be considered by business families both because it seems to 
be a promising turnaround strategy and because it prevents identity loss.  
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LIMITATIONS 
Our study is not free from the limitations of qualitative research conducted with a limited 
sample, which in turn opens up additional avenues for research. We acknowledge that there may 
be limitations with regard to the extent of the generalizability of the study, which was conducted 
in the specific context of Pakistan. While we are convinced that our key findings are 
generalizable to the general setting of family business portfolios—because we have no reason to 
assume that our identified patterns and underlying drivers differ systematically across contexts—
we nonetheless call for future research to replicate and validate our findings within more 
“individualistic” cultures and more “stable” contexts, for instance in the US and Europe. 
Moreover, as in every interview-based qualitative research, one might wonder whether the 
respondents provided correct and unbiased answers. While such bias can never be fully 
excluded, we believe that this is not a critical issue in our study because the good relationships 
that one of the authors had with many of the respondents seemed to help engender unbiased and 
reliable answers, as visible in the numerous statements about businesses being in crisis and 
mistakes that had been made. Additionally, confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. 
Furthermore, we note that our findings and the resulting propositions are analytical instead of 
statistical generalizations. The time could be ripe for quantitative studies.  
Concluding remarks 
How does a business family that owns a family firm portfolio react to declining performance? 
Our study of six family business portfolios with 20 exits from Pakistan reveals distinct and 
unique insights that hopefully will inspire other scholars to pursue further corresponding research 
in order to better understand the long-term endurance of family firm portfolios.
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TABLE 1: Description of the Cases and Overview of the Interviews 
Case Total 
Businesses  
Total Exits Location Founding Year Informants  Additional Data 
Sources 
Lucky 6 2 
 
Punjab 19**s Director 
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Owner 3 
Observations 
Phone Calls 
Brochures 
 
Kasf 11 2 Federal 1970s Founder 
Director 
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Owner 3 
Observations 
Phone Calls 
Brochures 
Internal Documents 
Websites 
Sunny 10 6 Punjab 19**s Director 
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Owner 3 
Owner 4 
Observations 
Phone Calls 
Brochures 
 
Miral 9 5 Punjab 19**s Former Director 
Director 
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Owner 3 
Observations 
Phone Calls 
Brochures 
Website 
 
Jami 6 3 Punjab 1990s Founder 
Director  
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Observations 
Phone Calls 
Pak 7 2 Punjab 1970s Director  
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Owner 3 
Observations 
Phone calls 
 
Note: Most of the interview partners are highly educated (e.g., many have business, engineering, or liberal arts education from Pakistani, US, or UK universities). 
Thus, they are familiar with the terminology and terms commonly used in business and academia/science. 
 43 
TABLE 2: Description of Legacy/Core Business with Satellites’ Exit Mode 
Case 
Name 
Legacy/Core 
Business 
Declining Performance 
and Exit  
Time Period 
Exited Satellites Exit and Assets Family 
Ownership 
Exit Mode 
Lucky  Farmers 2007 onward Fish farm Property kept as is Fully owned Shut down 
     Brick kiln  Property kept as is Fully owned Shut down 
Kasf Contractors 2006 onward Hotel  Property rented out Fully owned Shut down 
     Workshop Property used for real 
estate  
Fully owned Shut down 
Sunny Distributors 2003 onward Media Part of the property 
rented out 
Fully owned Shut down 
     Dairy plant Property not owned  Fully owned Shut down 
     Dairy farm Part of the property 
recently sold 
Fully owned Shut down 
     Auto dealership Property rented out Fully owned Shut down 
     Design house N/A Fully owned Sale 
     Restaurant N/A Partnership Sale 
Miral Manufacturers 2008 onward S/H Property not owned Fully owned Shut down 
     Export Property not owned Fully owned Shut down 
     Restaurant Property not owned Fully owned Shut down 
     Dairy Issues are still not 
settled about the 
remaining assets 
Fully owned Shut down 
     Dealership N/A Partnership Sale 
Jami Contractors 2006 onward Tannery N/A Partnership Sale 
     Export (Sporting 
Goods – Tannery)
N/A Partnership Sale 
     Transport N/A Fully owned Sale 
Pak Farmers 2007 onward Rice mill N/A Fully owned Sale 
     Ice manufacturing 
unit 
N/A Partnership Sale 
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TABLE 3: Additional Representative Data Supporting Each Second-Order Theme 
Second-Order 
Themes 
Representative First-Order Data: [First-Order Label Assigned] 
Family and 
satellite 
business 
identity fit  
- Owner 1, Lucky. “It has been so long since we started our family firm—imagine how people 
around us recognize us, know us and relate to us—it is very much the family and the business 
together. A very simple experiment if you ask someone in the city about our address, you 
would definitely hear the name of our father, together with the name of our main business 
[legacy] or one of our secondary businesses [satellite] in response: this confirms who we are”: 
[Recognition with the family] 
 
- Owner 2, Sunny. “We have known that for quite a long time, our family and business both are 
our recognition, because we are very much emotionally attached to both our family and our 
businesses. One day a friend came and said “[name of the Director]” why don’t you sell your 
office and the media company to me, or I will find someone with an interest in the business? I 
replied to him – I only love sitting in the office every day. I don’t have it operational. This is 
what I do, I come here two or three times a week, order a nice cup of tea from the restaurant 
downstairs…, make calls and just sit and relax”: [Recognition with the family] 
 
- Owner 1, Miral. “Our friends would call us by our business name instead of the family name, 
and the firm with all of its businesses [portfolio/satellites] has become our identity, our 
recognition and, of course, our pride”: [Recognition with the family] 
 
- Director, Lucky. “Not surprisingly, it is family, and it’s the name that comes first…. We 
relate ourselves to it… and with the other/secondary businesses [satellites] in the [portfolio]”: 
[Family name and legacy] 
 
- Owner 2, Lucky. “It is very hard to sell the lands of your forefathers…; the agri-land we own 
touches the boundaries of the town, and there is a great demand to buy it for housing. However, 
very few families in our area have actually sold land for property development, but like us, the 
rest still use it for farming purposes and own the land with no intention to sell”: [Family name 
and legacy] 
 
- Director, Miral. “When I joined the business I was in the final year of business school…; my 
father—who was ill at the time—approached me and said that I should now look after the 
business…. It came to me as a surprise; I was not involved in the business, and I was not 
expecting to join it that early…. At that time, I was also in the initial phase of expanding our 
business by starting the IT company, …. I didn’t want to disappoint my father and the family, 
because I was the eldest and they were looking to me to save the family business. It was hard 
for me to say no to my family and to let go and sell this business that had been established 
through the dedication of my grandfather and father”: [Family name and legacy] 
 
- Founder, Kasf. “In the initial days, I was traveling a lot because we had projects in various 
cities, and I often stayed in hotels. I liked the business very much, and the next thing I did was 
to buy this hotel [satellite], and it was a business in which I was interested.... Not once did I 
think of selling it; it is part of me, and my family did not propose selling”: [Family and 
business as same thing] 
 
- Owner 2, Sunny. “Our family business is very dear to us, and we do not distinguish our 
business from the family. We have no differences between the family and the family business. 
In particular, almost every business [satellite] is the outcome of a family member’s dream or 
intention to grow [the portfolio] of our family business…. This is like something you own and 
that is very dear to you, and you would not give it away…, even if you are facing very difficult 
conditions. This is what happened with us as well…. To me, when you sell something, it is like 
you are giving away part of your own self to someone else”: [Family and business as same 
thing]  
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- Owner 2, Sunny. “The businesses [legacy and satellite] and the family are the same, and we 
don’t have any separation between the two”: [Family and business as same thing] 
Recycling  - Director, Lucky. “It was about benefiting from the shutdown in the long term. We believed 
that closing down the businesses would keep us in the game, and there will always be a future 
possibility within reach”: [Creating opportunities for the future] 
 
- Director, Kasf. “We were not only transferring financial and other resources but human 
resources to other businesses to retain as many useful resources as possible…. After 
completing the… motorway project, there was a big gap of almost three to four years…. We 
had no new projects, so at this stage, we started a small project to save overhead, and we asked 
our brother [one of the Directors involved with the construction business; legacy] to look after 
our private hospital business”: [Creating opportunities for the future] 
 
-Owner 2, Sunny. The owners’ action of shutting down the satellite businesses was chosen in 
order to ensure the long-term success of the legacy business through recycling the satellite’s 
resources. “It was not possible to survive and continue to be successful in the future without 
making the finances available from within the firm .…we were repeatedly advised to take 
finances from outside, but we were afraid of further debt and suggested the Director [father of 
owner 2] to do what he had advised us earlier …to shut down the additional 
businesses[satellites]. Because my father and the family cherished the hard work of our 
grandfather, his name and reputation in the market, we agreed with him on this, because if we 
had kept the dairy plant and other businesses [satellites] operational, we would have ended up 
closing down our distribution business [legacy] as well”:   [Long-term success] 
- Owner 1, Miral. “There was the connection in the form of our family name, identification 
[who we are], which prompted our family owners to shut down and use [recycle] the resources 
[for other businesses]. We were trying to turn around the situation in our favor…; this is part of 
who we are…. By doing this [i.e., several shutdowns], we focused all of our energies [reusing 
the resources] on the core business of the firm”: [Connection with the business] 
Restarting - Owner 1, Lucky. “We started both the fish-farming and the kiln businesses, but because of the 
losses, we had no choice but to close the businesses temporarily…; the businesses were close 
to my heart and became a passion for me and my brother because we were both involved…. 
We always wanted to get back to the fish-farming business and the kiln business to continue 
our [entrepreneurial] passions, linked to our family business [portfolio]…. The intention/plan 
to start the business again was always there”: [Reconnecting with the business] 
 
- Director, Lucky. “Re-opening has always been in our mind from the beginning. I knew the 
intentions and my sons’ deep involvement in the business. At first, they didn’t want to sell it, 
because they intended to restart the businesses, and I am glad that we are back”: [Reconnecting 
with the business] 
 
- Owner 1, Sunny. “We shut down several of our subsequent [satellite] businesses with the 
intention of keeping everything in the family. This had a great impact on our business, because 
we had the choice to re-enter the business at any time in the future, whenever we are up for it. 
We restarted the automobile business a few months back”: [Expressing interest in the exited 
business] 
 
- Owner 2, Sunny. “We also wanted to be proactive to gain the maximum benefit from our 
decisions as much as we could…. We thought, let’s address the situation now and the best we 
can do and hope we can restart the dairy plant when the situation turns in our favor”: 
[Expressing interest in the exited business] 
 
- Director, Sunny. “We plan to restart the media business [satellite] after the market recovers. 
We have been closely observing because people are going back to the cinema and there is a 
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revival trend for big-screen movies. The passion for the movie business is still alive for us 
because we have not sold the property we own in the cinema district and we cannot wait to 
start a new project”: [Identification with the exited business] 
 
- Director, Kasf. “We decided to renovate the hotel from scratch, and now it is again going 
great…. Last year, we shifted our workshop to a new location near the capital city of Islamabad 
and made it operational once again…. Our family (and especially our father) was never wanted 
to sell the hotel; the hotel business was one of his earliest and probably most desired 
businesses, along with his first attempt at diversifying the business [legacy] after he founded 
Kasf”: [Identification with the exited business] 
 
Increasing 
performance 
decline  
- Owner 1, Lucky. “In difficult situations, you meet people, some of whom encourage you and 
others who take a negative approach. While we were going through that, I would hear people 
saying that our family has started projects that we would not be able to manage….” The 
business family did not want to lose focus because of the people surrounding them as the 
businesses were started with a long-term approach. Owner 1 reflected that with the increase in 
the decline of the performance, they kept cool, stayed committed and took up the challenge: “I 
remained committed to our family business and decision about the businesses [satellites], 
regardless of the increasing pressure of ongoing losses.”: [Taking up challenges] 
 
- Director, Kasf. “Our family has been going through hard times both in the business and 
because of our father’s health. My father wants to keep employees at the farmhouse, although 
we are hardly earning anything from it, but he never believes in selling, even in the most 
difficult times in his life…. With a very heavy heart, I had to downsize the temporary 
employees and shift the permanent employees to other facilities…. We have already closed 
down the businesses”: [Taking up challenges] 
 
- Director, Sunny. During the time when the business was declining the owners decided on 
closing the business with the worst picture in their mind and that would be the complete 
closure of the portfolio business. “I contemplated what could be the worst that could happen, 
and I was unable to accept defeat in the form of being taken over by someone else. That highly 
worried me, and I could only see positivity in using a portion of the exited businesses, which 
would only happen if we closed down…during periods of high levels of performance 
instability”: [Strongly responding to difficulties] 
 
- Owner 4, Sunny. The owners were not ready to give up easily, and for that reason, they even 
opted to sell their performing satellite businesses. “With the increased debt, I told my father to 
sell the business [design house], we don’t want to continue with it…; we were able to cash it at 
a good price…. I had an argument with my brother about it, that is, why did I invest in 
something that I don’t want to give time to…, but I wanted to help my father and family save 
our [legacy] business… We had debt and overdrawn balance... We didn’t want to risk our 
reputation, we closed down the businesses that were mostly started by my grandfather or my 
father…, and we relate to those businesses more (because of the emotional attachment) than 
those that came later as purely financial investments”: [Strongly responding to difficulties] 
 
- Director, Miral. The business family suffered due to the losses in the dairy plant, and they 
started closing their businesses one after the other when their performance was declining, 
despite having the opportunity to sell. “I will try my best to return to our previous position, and 
it doesn’t matter if we have closed down most of our shops…. We have come down to less than 
200 employees from 1000… We will revive”. At the time of the interviews, the family owners 
were negotiating with financiers to re-open the dairy business and to avoid the forced [exit] 
selling of the business. The Director showed strong belief that even when he has to close down 
all the businesses, they will revive again: [Belief in the revival of the family business] 
 
- Director, Kasf. The owners felt that it will not do them any good if they layoff the employees, 
and their belief in the revival made them shift the employees to other sites whenever possible. 
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“Our father strongly believed in our family business and his long-term strategies…. We hardly 
opted for downsizing in hard… and harder times, and we were mostly shifting the employees 
to other businesses [satellites], when possible. We were temporarily shutting down the 
[satellite] projects”: [Belief in the revival of the family business] 
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Figure 1: Data Structure 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Model 
 
